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Effects of Corporate Governance on Earnings Management: 
The Case of Lebanon 
 
Lama M. Al-Hafi 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Effects of corporate governance practices on various financial, managerial, and 
operational activities within organizations have been extensively studied in the previous 
two decades. Earnings management, viewed as legal and appropriate means by some 
researchers and illegal by others, is one of the financial activities that could be impacted by 
the corporate governance practices of the organization. Higher level of implementation of 
the corporate governance components (transparency of financial data, board of directors, 
ownership structure, corporate social responsibility and audit committee) is thought to 
reduce unfavorable earnings management. Several recent studies have concluded that 
Lebanese corporations do not give corporate governance much importance. Moreover, 
earnings management has not been tested thoroughly within the Lebanese context. This 
study focuses on determining the impact of good corporate governance practices on 
reducing unfavorable earnings management activities. In particular, the study aims at 
identifying the corporate governance components to reducing unfavorable earnings 
management by Lebanese organizations. Data were collected from questionnaires which 
were distributed to employees working at various Lebanese companies and having a certain 
level of familiarity with their company’s financial reporting. Results show that companies 
with higher degree of independence of the board of directors, effective audit committee, 
transparency in terms of financial reporting, and good corporate social responsibility 
practices tend to have less unfavorable earnings management. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Transparency of Financial Statements, Ownership 
Structure, Board of Directors, Audit Committee, Corporate Social Responsibility, and 
Earnings Management Practices.  
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
& EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
This chapter includes the overview and background of corporate governance and 
earnings management, the need for undertaking this study, the research problem aimed to 
be investigated, the research objectives, the relevance of this study, and finally the 
limitations. 
 
1.1 Overview and Background 
 In this section, a general summary of corporate governance functions will be 
presented as well as an overview about earnings management practices. 
 
1.1.1 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance within the last twenty-five years has become one of the 
highly inquired studies in the business field. It frames and controls all the rules and 
regulations that must be followed by all the firm’s participants. After the World War II, the 
United States exhibited the emergence of the high-status class. This class led to the 
expansion of corporations quickly without adequate accountability or control from the 
board of directors which resulted in several bankruptcies. Thus, the importance of 
corporate governance appeared, and over the past eras it has been expanding enormously in 
the U.S and other countries.  
2 
 
In the 1980s, the main purpose of applying corporate governance was focusing on 
arranging constitutional mechanisms for preventing managers, as much as possible, from 
serving their own interest (Khongmalai, Tang, & Siengthai, 2009). The board of directors 
played a major role in the internal governance of an organization by harmonizing the 
interests of owners and managers (O’Regan, O’Donnel, Kennedy, Bobtis, & Cleary, 2005). 
Moreover, the increasing difficulty of the challenging situations that are facing firms drove 
organizational practitioners and academicians to widen the corporate governance function. 
As a result, corporate governance functions have broadened to include not only monitoring 
and controlling, but also intensifying strategic plans and assuring the reliability of 
management procedures (Michie & Oughton, 2001). 
 Afterwards in 2007, the economic and financial crisis took place and created chaos 
on the level of the banking sector worldwide; it mostly affected the United Kingdom and 
the United States which are the world's leaders financially (Bruner, 2011). The capitals, 
London and New York, were in the center of the catastrophe in which their banks were 
harmed enormously through the high levels of losses and obligations on the mortgage 
securities. At the end of the crisis and the beginning of a new phase, both nations embraced 
several regulatory and instructive efforts to prevent such crises from reoccurring, and one 
of these efforts were corporate governance modification.  This modification is needed to 
provide shareholders with more power to restrain irresponsible managers in the future in all 
types of organizations not only financial ones (Bruner, 2011).  
 Both countries used almost the same approaches toward the catastrophe in which 
they gave more authority to the shareholders. However, the U.K and U.S corporate 
governance structures significantly differ on some basic issues where the U.K structure 
stressed much more attention to the shareholders than the U.S structure. This means that 
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U.K system is more shareholder-oriented than the U.S system (Bruner, 2011). In general, 
the concept of corporate governance is the same in any country, but it is modified with 
respect to different circumstances that occur in each country. 
 In fact, scholars and governments accepted the idea that corporate governance 
systems affect the firm's performance and long-standing values (Nelson, 2005). The agency 
theory is the theory that stimulates the functions of corporate governance (Baker & Owsen, 
2002). Because the owners are no longer in charge of control, a probable authority problem 
developed into the corporate system and this is the idea behind the theory. Agency 
conflicts occur when the managers, who are recruited to take decisions for the shareholders' 
maximum benefits, are taking decisions that best suit their own position or interest 
(Khongmalai et al., 2009). 
According to Dima, Ionesscu, and Tudoreanu (2013), corporate governance has 
established an idea that is associated with the management and the system of an 
organization. Therefore, corporate governance, originally, was seen as a structure that 
monitors and controls firms. Besides, corporate governance is considered to be the system 
that focuses on the distribution of tasks and rights among stakeholders (Organizations for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 2004). In addition, corporate governance is 
viewed as the administration and regulation procedures that are implemented by the firm. 
Also, it is defined as the key factor to enhance the financial and economic development, 
and provide more confidence to investors (Yassin, Ghanem, & Rustom). In general, 
corporate governance is a well-structured system that is established to control the 
organization through achieving long-term objectives, complying with rules and regulations, 
governing management practices and financial reports, and meeting the environmental 
needs. Furthermore, effective corporate governance should include specific characteristics: 
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transparency, accountability, responsibility, transparency in the organization’s activities 
and structures, accountability of the management, audit committee, and board of directors, 
and responsibility of the firm toward its investors.  
In Lebanon, according to the World Bank in 2003 addressing on the Corporate 
Governance in the MENA region, indicated that corporate governance is not that 
productive with respect to other countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Signifying 
that Lebanon is less effective considering public responsibility, data disclosure, and overall 
governance (Elgammal, Assad, and Jurdy, 2014). However, the Lebanese banking sector 
was able to relocate itself regarding the efficiency of corporate governance by applying the 
modern international principles, and implementing regulations that guarantee its reliability 
(Elgammal et al., 2014). Yet, other sectors in Lebanon still consider that corporate 
governance is not of a great importance. This is due to believing that Beirut Stock trade has 
a limited number of small to medium firms whose stocks are not broadly traded (Elgammal 
et al., 2014). 
 In general, many challenges are faced by corporate governance like globalization 
and technology progress (Fadun, 2013). Consequently, in the climate of dynamic and 
macro-environment changes, effective corporate governance must assist in the efficient 
organization's management. Additionally, because of less governmental monitoring and 
rules, effective corporate governance recognizes the need and importance for 
accountability and keeps records of all activities engaged as an evidence of its 
transparency. Effective corporate governance encourages economic expansion and 
improvement (Fadun, 2013). An effective corporate governance can be measured 
according to the transparency of financial statements, the structure of ownership, the 
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effectiveness of board of directors, the usefulness of audit committee, and the appliance of 
corporate social responsibility.  
One of the many issues that corporate governance handles is earnings management. 
In the last few years, corporate earnings management has been standing out among the 
most widely examined parts in finance and financial accounting (Matsuura, 2008). By 
managing earnings, managers hide the real earnings and financial position of the 
organization (Matsuura, 2008).  
 
1.1.2 Earnings Management  
Earnings management is a strategy used to keep a stable image of the firm’s 
earnings. “When managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company, or influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers” (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). 
According to FASB (1985), the nature of accrual accounting “attempts to record the 
financial effects on an entity of transactions and other events and circumstances that have 
cash consequences for the entity in the periods in which those transactions, events, and 
consequences occur rather than only in the period in which cash is received or paid by the 
entity” (Abu Siam, Binti Laili, & Bin Khairi, 2014). This provides managers a substantial 
amount of discretion in recognizing the actual earnings an organization reports in any 
given time (Abu Siam et al., 2014). 
As a matter of fact, earnings management can be separated into accounting and 
real. Accounting earnings management are decisions taken by managers and are accepted 
under the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), like converting the 
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inventory estimation method from FIFO to LIFO or vice versa, and changing from straight 
line depreciation method to double declining depreciation method. However, real earnings 
management are decisions related to actual investments and production, like decreasing the 
research and development expenses and administrative expenses (Matsuura, 2008). 
Some consider these practices as illegal acts while others consider them legal. 
Those who view them as illegal acts believe that managers intentionally manipulate the 
organization’s earnings to maintain an image that meets the prearranged goals. Therefore, 
to increase the number of investors in the firm, management deceives them by structuring 
transactions to keep the annual financial reports stable instead of having years of satisfying 
or dissatisfying balances. However, those who think these practices are legal believe that 
the company is adopting an added-value activity. Earnings management is perceived as a 
tool that guides management in allocating resources. It will increase the company’s value 
without manipulating financial statements and at the same time it doesn’t reflect the 
economic reality in any way. In addition, current accounting system contains some options 
that permit management to manage earnings. In general, managers can use these options to 
reach their objectives, and as long as they are using them within the borders of GAAP, 
earnings management is considered legal (Matsuura, 2008). 
According to Abu Siam et al. (2014), internal and external members of any 
business depend on the financial statements that are supposed to deliver accurate and 
valuable data. Also, the efficiency of the market depends on the data which flow to capital 
markets. When earnings management occur and misleading data exit, the market will not 
be able to value securities appropriately. Therefore, earnings management can misrepresent 
the real performance of the organization and reduce the creditors’ and shareholders’ ability 
to make the right decisions (Abu Siam et al., 2014). Subsequently, the real question is can 
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earnings quality be trusted? This question is mainly asked by both creditors and regulators 
who ask for accurate ways to prevent factors that are possibly the reason behind misleading 
earnings. For example, one of these factors is managerial discretion which is mostly 
spotted. It mainly happens if the relationship between the agent and the principal is 
influenced due to some inadequacies, or if the corporate governance implementations are 
not availed. Many recent studies on earnings quality revealed that when managerial 
discretion occurs, the organization’s real economic performance is lost (Jouber & 
Fakhfakh, 2011). In addition, many studied the factors and constraints that affect earnings 
management. They found that the audit quality is a major constraint on the magnitude of 
earnings management (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998). The 
destruction of creditors’ certainty in the quality of financial reports, and the obstruction of 
the effectual movement of capital in the financial market result from the practice of 
earnings management (Jackson & Pitman, 2001). Therefore, in order to detect and limit 
earnings management, audit companies must distinguish themselves through specialization 
for example (Watkins, Hillison, & Morecroft, 2004). Specialization allows the auditor to 
deliver wider services and credibility; thus, the auditor will be able to find techniques for a 
more effective auditing process and improve the ability to detect and limit earnings 
management (Beasley & Petroni, 2001). 
Why do managers record accruals? Mainly there are two motivations that make 
managers record accruals: performances/signaling reasons and opportunistic earnings 
management. Performance/signaling reasons means when managers want to show a better 
organizational economic performance, they record accruals. While the opportunistic 
earnings management is when managers hide bad performance or delay the recognition of 
good performance for them to maximize their effectiveness.  As a result, when 
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shareholders notice that earnings management is opportunistic, they reduce the accounting 
numbers created by the organization’s management (Habib, 2004).  
Therefore, agency theory is considered a core reason behind earnings management 
practices (Richardson, 2000). The conflict that occurs between managers and shareholders 
urges for the separation between ownership and management (Khalil, 2010). This is due to 
the complete independence from managers when it comes to accounting decisions which 
gives them the authority to make selections and implement a scope of practices that may 
refute the owner’s interests leading to earnings management practices (Khalil, 2010). 
The aim of this research is to study the relation between corporate governance and 
earnings management, and to what extent the former influence the latter.  
 
1.2 Purpose of the Study   
As mentioned earlier, the main purpose of this research is to determine the effect of 
corporate governance on earnings management practices. Several researches were 
conducted to study the relationship of corporate governance and its impact on the 
limitation of earnings management. In their study, Chtourou, Bedard, and Courteau (2001), 
stated that effective corporate governance limits earnings management activities. In 
addition, the experience of the board of directors seems to decrease earnings management 
practices. According to Findlay (2006), an independent board of directors must be 
endorsed for the company to be more productive in monitoring the discretionary judgment 
of the management. In addition, according to a study done in Thailand, the board of 
directors that carries out several directional situations,  has a greater experience, 
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knowledge, and skills in monitoring tasks than the one that handle only one firm’s board 
(Sukeecheep, Yarram & Al Farooque, 2013).  
After assuming the relation between the components of corporate governance with 
earnings management, several examinations must be done to test the effect of corporate 
governance on earnings management practices. Finally, some recommendations must be 
suggested for future studies. 
 
1.3 Research Question 
In this section, the researcher tries to examine if there is a relationship between the 
transparency  of financial statements , ownership structure, board of directors, audit 
committee and corporate social responsibility (corporate governance components) and 
earnings management practices. In other words, the researcher tries to answer a very 
important question which is how corporate governance components and earnings 
management practices are related.  
1.4 Research Objective 
Since corporate governance and earnings management have recently become the 
center of attention for all businesses, we studied the relation between these two matters. In 
addition, according to the latest studies, developing nations are in need for well advanced 
corporate governance. Therefore, this examination was done to test the corporate 
governance and its influence on earnings management in Lebanese companies. In this 
study, the effects of corporate governance on earnings management practices are studied in 
general. Then, some of the corporate governance components are examined to find their 
relation with earnings management.  
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The aim is to see which component of corporate governance, whether the 
transparency of financial statements, the ownership structure, the board of directors, the 
audit committee, or the corporate social responsibility lower(s) the likelihood of earnings 
management practices. Thus, the relationship between these components and earnings 
management will be tackled thoroughly. Finally, earnings management incentives are 
added to see their effect on the relationship of the corporate governance components and 
earnings management practices. 
 
1.5 Relevance of the Study 
The study upon its completion will reveal the relationship between the above 
components of the corporate governance and earnings management practices. Furthermore, 
it will show the influence of the incentives of earnings management on the practices of 
earnings management. Moreover, it will show how the application of corporate governance 
by corporations in a developing country like Lebanon impacts the practices of earnings 
management.  
 
1.6 Limitations of the Study 
 The survey sought the view of different employment levels in which every 
employee’s answer was a perspective of different sections; thus there wasn’t much interest 
in the study. This was one of the limitations. Moreover, due to time limitation and 
deadlines, the surveyed employees were all within the campus of the Lebanese American 
University (LAU), Beirut. 
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The aim of this research is to study the relation between corporate governance and 
earnings management, and to what extent does the former influence the latter. The 
following section presents a view about previous studies done about the topic.  
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Chapter II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter of the study, the prior researches and the hypotheses are presented. 
The first section discusses the corporate governance including its components 
(transparency of financial statements, ownership structure, board of directors, audit 
committee, and corporate social responsibility). The second section discusses the earnings 
management practices. The third section links between the corporate governance 
performance and earnings management practices. The last section states the hypotheses 
that are tested. 
 
2.1 Corporate Governance 
Certainly, corporate policies are to a large scope responsible for the business 
performance, but the extent of earnings management depends more on the operating 
performance (Chung, Firth, & Kim, 2005).  In addition, corporate governance policies 
offer conditions that might be satisfactory for earnings management like “opportunistic 
behavior, a culture of self-fulfillment that prizes short-term gains at the expense of long-
term stability and habits of selective and subjective disclosure, etc.”, or unsatisfactory like 
“ a culture encouraging transparency, integrity and accountability” (El Mehdi & Seboui, 
2011).  
Corporate governance is the framework by which corporations are organized and 
ruled (Adiloglu & Vuran, 2012). Its main concern is generally with the ways organizations 
are ruled and specifically with the relation between the owners of the corporation and its 
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managers. Recently, the effects of corporate governance on the organization’s performance 
have kept on increasing across the board conspicuousness in the capital market economy 
sector (Adiloglu & Vuran, 2012).  The stakeholder’s expectations regarding corporate 
governance performance have never been that high, and the examination done by investors 
and controllers has never been that strict (Adiloglu & Vuran, 2012).  As a result, the 
scrutiny has not only been limited to the corporate governance performance in general but 
also it included transparency of financial statements, ownership structure, board of 
directors, audit committee, and corporate social responsibility. 
 
2.1.1 Transparency of Financial Statements  
Transparency in reporting all financial transactions and disclosures have always 
been a requirement that assures the honesty and credibility of any company. For long term 
survival, transparency is very essential in any business. Capital market depends on 
corporate governance to secure the transparency of financial statements (Fung, 2014). 
Transparency of financial reports means that all financial data and transactions must be 
conveyed regardless of its assessment. In addition, transparency in financial statements 
occurs when all stakeholders have the ability to access all the needed information to value 
financial institutes on a timely basis (Vishwanath & Kaufmann, 2001). 
Transparency is noticeably related to the topic of governance reformulation, in 
which it represents a fundamental value of corporate governance (Adiloglu & Vuran, 
2012). Also, in the corporate governance guiding principles of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), transparency presents a primary 
foundation where the shareholder’s assurance and the market efficiency rely on the 
disclosure of correct time data about the performance of the corporation. The company’s 
14 
 
stakeholders will stay up-to-date about all the techniques used to govern and manage a 
company in a transparent atmosphere (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
Several activities and procedures lead to an off-balance sheet item resulting in a 
decrease in the transparency of financial statements. Investments in the equity of other 
companies, transfers of financial assets, retirement procedures, leases, and conditional 
debts and guarantees are all examples of actions that lessen the transparency of financial 
reporting (Lander & Auger, 2008). As a result, consecutive let-downs of several 
corporations like Adelphia and WorldCom showed a real failure in the corporate 
governance system, auditing procedure, and financial reporting practices. Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 aroused due to huge efforts that were exerted to regain the citizens’ confidence 
in the American business, the accounting profession, and the stock market. (Lander & 
Auger, 2008). The main aim behind Sarbanes Act is to increase transparency in the 
financial reporting and accounting. 
According to Ştefănescu and Ţurlea (2014), transparency is a way of action or an 
attitude of confident leaders who make all their actions public and recognized permanently. 
Transparency is a wide flow of information. Transparency overcomes ethics in which 
everything must be reported to the public to ensure effective governance (Ball, 2009). 
Transparency and ethical values are associated because of the fact that they assure all the 
population of the quality of services offered, and satisfy the population needs (Holzner & 
Holzner, 2006).  
It is important to note that one of the reasons behind the subprime crisis in 2008 
was the absence of transparency of the data in the financial market (Mendonca, Galva˜o, & 
Loures, 2010). Furthermore, these data are considered important since they are to some 
extent related element to the market discipline. Likewise, a tool for observing financial 
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organizations is the viable transparency in the data revealed to the private operators 
(Flannery, 1998). Also, transparency of data to the market permits the private operators to 
examine the main information on investments, assessment process, and risk exposure 
(Mendonca et al., 2010).  
 
2.1.2 Ownership Structure  
Ownership structure of a firm is the distribution of equity according to the capital 
and votes. This structure is very essential for corporate governance because it decides on 
the incentives that must be given to managers who will direct the firm's financial 
efficiency.  
The perception of ownership structure is a core concept within the wide range of 
corporate governance. Actually, ownership structure is considered a tool of corporate 
governance. Berle and Means in 1932 argued that in modern corporations, management 
motivation to maximize organization’s productivity decreases through the separation of 
ownership and control (Hu & Izumida, 2008). 
Ownership is considered a power that is supported socially in a way that gives it the 
authority to control something that is completely owned and employed for personal 
purposes (Henryani & Kusumastuti, 2013). However, ownership structure is considered as 
the different patterns and systems of ownership that are present in a firm or the amount of 
stocks owned by inside and outside shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, 
ownership structure is important to show essential variables in the capital structure. They 
are determined by the percentage amount of shares owned by internal and external 
shareholders not only by the amount of debts and equity (Xu & Yan, 1999). 
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There are several sorts of ownership structures: public ownership, government 
ownership, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and ownership which is a 
combination of all. Public ownership is the shares owned by the government in an 
organization. Public ownership has a crucial role in forming an effective government 
system functions because it acts independently when it comes to management assessment 
(Jensen, 1993). As a regulator, the government is responsible to govern individuals and 
make sure that the firm is operating under a corporation management to look over its 
stakeholders mainly the investors (Henryani & Kusumastuti, 2013). Government is the 
superior controller in organizations that it owns and are well-known as the State Owned 
Corporations. Companies owned by the government are less independent than those that 
are not because their main aim is to stay in collaboration with the country’s well-being 
(Henryani & Kusumastuti, 2013). 
The most significant types of ownership are the managerial and institutional. The 
agency conflict occurs between managers who represent shareholders and shareholders or 
investors who are the principal of the organization. Agency conflict explains the presence 
of managerial ownership structure (Henryani & Kusumastuti, 2013). Agency problems 
lower the value of any corporation. An increase in the managerial ownership creates an 
essential incentive that encourages managers to act on the behalf of the shareholders and 
maximize the share’s price (Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995). Managerial ownership is a 
share ownership controlled by the board of directors, employees, managers and the 
company’s other internal devices. Unlike managerial ownership which focuses on the 
personal owners, institutional ownership focuses on the institution itself (Henryani & 
Kusumastuti, 2013). It refers to the shares that are owned by other large financial 
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corporations. In general, companies buy large lumps of a corporation’s shares in order to 
have control on the management.  
 
2.1.3 Board of Directors 
The board of directors is the elected members that supervise all the activities of the 
organization. The board of directors as the highest authority in an organization which 
exerts a great influence on the firm’s performance. As a result, all activities and 
transactions are influenced by the board's sovereignty. The board’s main aim is to act for 
the favor of all shareholders. The board represents the shareholders in the firm and strives 
to make the greatest outcome of the corporation’s activities (Argandona & Ayuso, 2009). 
The board of directors plays an important role in controlling and supervising an 
organization’s management to assure that the managers are working for the shareholders’ 
benefits (Abu Siam et al., 2014). Thus, the board of directors has an essential job when it 
comes to monitoring and regulating the quality and consistency of financial statements 
(Beasley, 1996). In addition, the board ensures the disclosures of financial reports and the 
operating outcomes of the firm are being provided to all stakeholders including all 
shareholders. This is a significant responsibility that has been delegated to the board of 
directors in order to govern. As a result, the supervision of the board on all financial 
statements is very important because managers have the tendency to manage earnings and 
possibly mislead investors (Abu Siam et al., 2014).  
In relation to the board of directors, one can consider several characteristics like the 
independence, size, meeting, etc…This study focuses on the independence and 
effectiveness of the board of directors. Outside directors dominate the board, and they must 
be independent and separated from the management. Many studies found that as the 
18 
 
independence and effectiveness of board of directors increases, the organization's 
performance improves (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Baysinger & Butler, 1985).Sustaining 
independent members in the board of directors can accomplish the principles of a righteous 
effective corporate governance (“King Report on Corporate Governance,” 2002). Thus, the 
independence of directors leads to more effectiveness in to controlling the activities of the 
organization (Bhagat & Black, 2001). Moreover, all meetings must be planned and 
arranged by the board’s members directly; specifically when the situation needs immediate 
movement and regulation (Shivdasani & Zenner, 2004). In order to monitor the firm’s 
performance constantly, the board’s members should meet at least one to four times yearly 
(“King Report on Corporate Governance,” 2002).  
 
2.1.4 Audit Committee  
Audit committee is one of the crucial components of corporate governance since it 
plays an important role in ratifying it (Badara & Saidin, 2013). It includes specialists of 
different parts in a firm for self-governing purposes. Auditing committee is an operating 
group of the board of directors responsible for the supervision of financial reports and 
disclosures. In fact, audit committee improves the quality of auditing at two levels (Piot & 
Janin, 2007). First, the committee reduces or limits the use of earnings management 
activities by monitoring the performance of the accounting department. Second, any 
indiscretion in the financial statements or disclosures will more likely be revealed due to 
the committee assortment between the internal and external auditors, and its protection for 
the sovereignty of external auditors (McMullen, 1996).  
Members of auditing committee are in charge of many responsibilities like the 
reliability of financial statements, the effectiveness of internal audit and external audit, and 
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the prevention of any prohibited actions (El-Kassar, Elgammal, and Bayoud, 2014). 
Moreover, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) defines audit committee as a group of 
individuals that are selected by the board of directors to oversee all accounting and 
financial information. Nowadays, the role of audit committee in controlling the auditing 
process has become more traceable and difficult. Thus, it is known as the most reliable 
patrol in any business (Levitt, 2000). In addition, the audit committee task as mentioned in 
the Lebanese Code of Corporate Governance in 2006, is to design and asses the 
organization’s financial statements and data. Further, it supervises the financial reports 
done by the internal audit. It also makes a meticulous yearly report that is revised by the 
board of directors beforehand of the addition to the organization’s annual report (Lebanese 
Code of Corporate Governance, 2006).  
Several studies were conducted to assess the effectiveness of the audit committee 
when working as a team with the internal audit. It is important to note that the audit 
committee has the greater power when assessing the internal audit responsibilities and 
hiring the best person for directing the internal auditing (Davies, 2009). Also, audit 
committee must provide guidelines for the internal audit to perform its tasks and achieve 
enhancement in all of its functions (Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). It is as well responsible 
for sustaining the independence of the internal audit (Goodwin & Yeo, 2001). 
 
2.1.5 Corporate Social Responsibility  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a new concept to business. Being 
compliant with the laws, norms, and ethics improve the quality of life of all creatures. 
Since it has been an important issue in the last few years, and it affects the organizations 
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performance as a whole, a study has been conducted to examine the relation between 
corporate social responsibility and earnings management.  
Corporate social responsibility has attained notice in the last few years from several 
industrial entities. CSR has become a requirement for all organizations, not only for large 
ones. It assists firms to stay in compliance with all norms, laws, and ethics to ameliorate 
the human’s welfare.  According to Kim, Park, and Wier (2011), CSR proponents believe 
that all entities should carry out social practices for stakeholders’ advantage. Also, CSR 
isn’t considered a waste of the company’s scarce resources; however, it is viewed as an 
important constituent that contributes in creating value for all stakeholders (El-Kassar, 
Messarra, & Elgammal, 2015). Moreover, CSR supporters assume that firms are 
materialistic prospectors that don’t initiate any social activity unless they get pressured; 
this is typical in underprivileged countries.  
According to an editor in the Canadian Financial Post magazine, corporations must 
always make sure that their practices agree with all the standards and rules of CSR strategy 
that is applied by the Canadian government (Hassselback, 2014). Applying CSR activities 
are considered easy to huge organizations, because they have all the resources needed to be 
socially responsible unlike the case of small corporations. Corporate social responsibility is 
when the business act with conscious and all corporations should be socially active for 
them to survive (Legg’s, 2014). In addition, Gainer (2010) referred to social responsibility 
as “movements” that define a custom of ideas and thoughts about business practices in 
which promoters encourage their implementation by corporations. Through engaging social 
practices, organizations possess positive behavior from their stakeholders, make strong 
relations with them, and build a respectable image for the business (Du, Bhattacharya, & 
Sen, 2010).  
21 
 
Moreover, corporate social responsibility is a strategic assessment where an 
organization has an obligation towards the society. This obligation includes many 
responsibilities within and outside the firm. Obligations within the organization consist of 
all commitments towards employees like providing fringe benefits, paying wages and 
paying transportation. Obligations carried outside the organization include sponsorship, 
funding different associations, being ecofriendly, etc… (Mitchell R, 1992). The main 
purpose of CSR is that the firm should be responsible for more than its commitment 
towards its stakeholders. It must also be responsible for all the consequences of its 
activities that are not due to economic results; however, it must consider the society and 
environment resources (Robins, 2005). According to Garriga and Domenec, (2004), there 
are four concepts of CSR: the instrumental, the political, the integrative, and the ethical. 
The instrumental concept suggests that a business is a way to make profit and its social 
activities are a tool to recognize the financial results. The political concept proposes that a 
firm uses its power in the society in order to achieve political aims. The integrative concept 
mainly focuses on the society’s necessities. Finally, the ethical concept is perceived when a 
firm does all its ethical obligations towards the society.  
A way to measure corporate social responsibility is by determining the corporate 
social performance (CSP). A way to practice CSR and make it feasible is by CSP (Huang, 
2010). Stakeholder theory is one way to evaluate CSP. The management and the 
stakeholders’ interests are very essential for the continuity of any company (Tokoro, 2006). 
However, management’s interests sometimes contradict stakeholders’ interests. Therefore, 
the best thing to do is to maximize profit while meeting the interest of a wide range of 
stakeholders (Jensen, 2002).   
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2.2 Earnings Management Practices 
Arosa, Iturralde, and Maseda (2012) defined earnings management as “the process 
of taking deliberate steps within the constraints of generally accepted accounting principles 
to bring about a desired level of reported earnings.” While Li, Ho Park, and Shuji Bao 
(2014) defined earnings management as the use of management perception in financial 
statements and transactions structure to deceive stakeholders about the firm’s financial 
performance or to attract external creditors. Chtourou et al. (2001), concluded that the 
practices that best fit an organization are linked to less earnings management activities 
which will lead to a better governance performance. The difference between earnings 
management and fraud is that it uses the accounting principles and procedures which apply 
to the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
In their book, Ronen and Yaari (2007) differentiated between three types of 
earnings management: the white, the black and the grey. White earnings management are 
the beneficial ones in which they take advantage of the elasticity of choice in the 
accounting treatment to improve the transparency of financial data. However, the black 
earnings management are the pernicious ones in which they are used to misrepresent 
financial data, decrease transparency of financial reports, and mislead stakeholders; this 
concept is close to fraud. The grey earnings management are used when the firm uses the 
accounting methods to either maximize the management value, or to increase the economic 
efficiency.  
Several reasons lead to the practice of earnings management. For instance, 
organizations might manage the earnings with the intention to affect the stock market 
perceptions in order to raise their compensation. Hence, this decreases the possibility of 
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violating the lending agreements and avoiding the governing interventions (Healy et al., 
1999). Earnings management can cause severe and destructive influences on the future 
performance of any organization according to previous studies that revealed evidence of 
the harmful effects on the long term (Kao, Wu, & Yang, 2009). Nevertheless, wrong data 
about the financial performance of the business will be delivered to stockholders and thus 
lead to hostile choices (Bhattacharya, Daouk, & Welker, 2003). 
 
2.3 Corporate Governance Components and Earnings Management 
Practices 
All components of corporate governance (transparency of financial statement, 
ownership structure, board of directors, audit committee, and corporate social 
responsibility) that were discussed earlier play a role in influencing earnings management 
practices.  
 
2.3.1 Transparency of Financial Statement and Earnings Management Practices 
Transparency of financial statements help in detecting and reporting all forms of 
earnings management practices. In a transparent atmosphere, any reader can easily detect 
earnings management practices. Several examinations were done to study the influence of 
transparency in reporting on the ability of users to identify earnings management (Hunton, 
Libby, & Mazza, 2006). In general, many studies detected that the greater the transparency 
in disclosures, the higher the recognition of earnings management. Usually, managers 
prefer a lower transparency in disclosing formats like the addition of liabilities and 
expenses in the closing notes and changes in the market value of stakeholder’s equity 
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(Hunton et al., 2006). Thus, managers consider that there is a benefit resulting from 
depriving some shareholders’ ability to determine earnings management (Hunton et al., 
2006). According to a study done by Hunton et al. in 2006, members in a lower transparent 
atmosphere reported that earnings management practices is not noticeable to users, 
increases stock value, and do not have any influence on the reputation of management’s 
honesty. On the contrary, this study added that participants in a higher transparent 
atmosphere indicated that earnings management can easily be detected by users. Moreover, 
this decreases stock value, and harms the management’s reputation. The results advocated 
that an increase in the requirements of transparent reporting lowers the attempts of earnings 
management practices in the part of high transparency or modifies the practices of earnings 
management to more concealed techniques. 
 
2.3.2 Ownership Structure and Earnings Management Practices 
Because of its instability in the last few years, ownership structure has been 
improved. According to Heubischl (2006), managers can control the firm more 
independently in a more isolated share ownership. Since ownership structure has an 
influence on management performance, and the latter can engage earnings management 
practices, therefore, ownership structure indirectly has an effect on earnings management 
practices. 
Different predictions were deduced concerning managerial ownership and earnings 
management. Some anticipated that when managerial ownership rises, the motivations to 
modify in earnings decrease (Aygun, IC, & Sayim, 2014). However, other suggested that 
when managers have high levels of ownership in the company, they might manipulate 
earnings to increase their profits (Stulz, 1988). Previous studies showed that both 
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predictions were applicable. In addition, Warfield et al. in 1995 studied the managerial 
influence on earnings management and they found that there is a negative correlation 
between these two variables (Aygun et al., 2014). Similarly, a study that was done by 
Gabrielsen Jeffrey and Thomas in 2002, found that there is a relation between managerial 
ownership and earnings management in some different countries like the US and Denmark. 
On the other hand, Yeo, Tan, Hoand Chen in 2002, conducted a similar study and found 
that in Singapore there is a positive relation between those two variables. Also, the research 
that was conducted by Aygun et al., in 2014, revealed that there is a significant relation 
between ownership structure and earnings management. 
In addition, earlier studies indicated that high amounts of institutional ownership 
have a huge influence on corporate governance structure (Alves, 2011). It was expected 
that institutional investors in comparison with individual investors have larger resources 
and capabilities for an effective monitoring of managers (Aygun et al., 2014). As a result, 
this will decrease the ability of managers to manipulate the company’s earnings (Chung, 
Firth & Kim, 2002). Thus, the relation between institutional ownership and earnings 
management is inversely related. Conversely, previous studies show diverse results 
regarding the influence of institutional ownership on earnings management (Aygun et al., 
2014). 
For example, in 2003, Koh examined the connection between the Australian 
companies’ institutional ownership and strategies of aggressive earnings management. He 
found that there is a positive correlation between these two variables which may propose 
that institutional investors offer motivations for managers to change earnings. Likewise, 
Al-Fayoumi, Abuzayed and Alexander in 2010, indicated that in Nigerian manufacturing 
companies there is a positive significance between earnings management and institutional 
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ownership. However, one study suggested that there is a negative correlation between the 
two variables that means high levels of institutional ownership. This signifies that the 
monitoring of institutional investors is one of the elements that reduce managers’ 
manipulation of earnings (Aygun et al., 2014). Moreover, according to a study done in 
Turkey there is a negative significance between institutional ownership and earnings 
management (Aygun et al., 2014).   
The combination of all these types of ownership plays a role in maintaining the 
organization’s performance and reducing chances of earnings manipulation. According to 
Hajiha and Farhani (2011), ownership structure is used in the corporate governance system, 
or the firm’s management structure and decreases the cost of agency conflicts (Henryani & 
Kusumastuti, 2013). As mentioned earlier that the conflict which happens between owners 
and managers is the reason behind agency cost which caused several arguments related to 
ownership structure. Investors, who have less ownership interests, or what is called by 
dispersed ownership, lead to agency conflicts in companies because shareholders have little 
incentives to take care of the strategic decisions of the management. Since they own a 
small percentage of shares in the company, shareholders don’t feel that they own or have 
control over the corporation (Fazlzadeh et al., 2011). Furthermore, dispersed investors 
don’t have the qualified information and knowledge to make effective decisions (Lee, 
2008).  However, investors who own large percentage of shares in the company, or who are 
also known as concentrated ownership reduce agency problems because they have strong 
incentives and monitoring power over management decisions (Fazlzadeh et al., 2011); thus, 
reducing the intentions of earnings manipulation. 
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2.3.3 Board of Directors and Earnings Management Practices 
Prior studies supported the idea that the independence and effectiveness of board of 
directors can more likely decrease earnings management practices (Klein, 2002). 
Furthermore, studies that were conducted in the United Kingdom and United States from 
1991 to 1993, through using a sample of 1,271 entities in the U.K. and 687 entities in the 
U.S. found that directors independence play a key role in limiting earnings management 
practices (Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2005). On the other hand, some existing studies found 
that there is no relation between the independence and usefulness of board of directors and 
earnings management (Niu, 2006). According to Xie, Davvidson, and DaDalt (2003), there 
is a negative association between the directors’ independence and earnings management 
practices by examining a sample of 110 entities in the U.S. Besides, a study that was done 
on Canadian corporations found that the board’s level of independence is not related to the 
level of unusual accruals (Niu, 2006). 
 
2.3.4 Audit Committee and Earnings Management Practices 
 In their study, Baxter and Cotter (2009), concentrated on the arrangement and 
attributes of audit committee and its influence on enhancing earnings quality in Australian 
organizations before applying mandatory prerequisites to the committees in the year 2003. 
They found that audit committee decreases earnings management practices, but doesn’t 
decrease the errors resulting from estimation of accruals. Additionally, the study found that 
the financial experience of the audit committee members has a significance on affecting the 
earnings management practices. Other features of audit committee didn’t have significance 
on earnings management practices. Further studies also found different factors that impact 
earnings management. For example, one study found that implementation and support of 
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the guidelines of corporate governance in the organization lead to enhancement in the 
practices of earnings management (Teitel & Machuga, 2010). Another study found that 
public entities are more traditional in their financial reporting than private firms, and their 
management use of normal accruals is lower (Givoly, Hyn, & Katz, 2010). Thus, earnings 
management practices in public firms are healthier than that in private ones and this is 
because public firms wants to avoid agency costs and lawsuit risks (Hamdan, Mushtaha, & 
Al-Sartawi, 2013).  
 According to a study done by Hamdan and Abu Ijeila (2010), audit committees in 
Jordanian industrial firms have no association in limiting earnings management practices 
(Hamdan et al., 2013). However, the study of Teitel and Machuga’s in 2010, revealed that 
applying the rules of best corporate governance practices and external audit improves the 
practices of earnings management.  
 
2.3.5 Corporate Social Responsibility and Earnings Management Practices 
 In the absence of corporate social responsibility and the concentration on private 
benefits, Prior, Surroca, and Tribo (2008) argue that managers have a higher tendency to 
get involved in earnings management practices. Sometimes getting involved in earnings 
management practices creates a probability of losing shareholders which is important for 
the continuity of the firm (Prior et al., 2008). Therefore, managers get threatened from 
different stakeholders influencing the organization’s real value which results in putting the 
organization’s reputation under risk and managers might lose their job (Fomburn, 
Gardberg, & Barnett, 2000). Consequently, managers have a motivation to engage 
corporate social responsibility as a tactical way to recompense stakeholders and affect the 
way they view the actual future of the organization, divert the attention from performing 
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any accounting based or real earnings management practices. Thus, contributing in CSR 
activities is determined more by opportunistic actions than ethical vitals (Alsaadi, Jaafar, & 
Ebrahim, 2013). 
In addition, according to Scholtens and Kang (2013), when CSR practices in Asian 
countries are engaged, there is a less tendency to perform earnings management practices. 
Also, CSR behaviors have positive effects on protecting investors. Therefore, in Asian 
countries earnings management practices are moderated by engaging in CSR activities 
which are accustomed by the legal structure.  
 
2.4 Hypotheses 
H1: A higher transparency in the financial statements leads to lower earnings management 
practices. 
H2: An effective ownership structure leads to lower earnings management practices. 
H3:  A higher degree of independence and effectiveness of the board of directors leads to 
lower earnings management practices. 
H4: A more effective audit committee leads to lower chances of engaging in earnings 
management practices. 
H5: A higher level of corporate social responsibility leads to lower chances of engaging in 
earnings management practices. 
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Chapter III 
METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, the methodology followed to conduct this study is presented. Each 
phase of the standard approach of design analysis, measurement techniques, sample, data 
collection, and statistical methods is discussed.  
 
3.1 Design Analysis 
 Several methods can be used to measure earnings management practices. One of 
these methods is the “Modified Jones Model” (Islam, Ali, & Ahmad, 2011). Previous 
studies considered Modified Jones model an effective technique while others found it 
ineffective. Those who considered it effective found that it is mostly beneficial in 
developing economies. The main idea of this model is to split accruals into non-
discretionary and discretionary accruals. The change in receivables leads to a change in 
sales, and this is where Standard Jones model is converted to Modified Jones model (Islam 
et al., 2011).  
 The above technique isn’t used in this research instead a survey data collection was 
conducted. Besides, the data was analyzed in accordance with a research goal which aims 
to test the correlation between corporate governance and earnings management practices 
with an intention to find the most effective way to decrease these practices.  
 All variables measured in the research were constructed in accordance with the 
suggested hypotheses. The questionnaire includes the needed questions which implies on 
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the measured variables particularly corporate governance and earnings management 
practices.  
The questionnaire is divided into eight parts. The first part is the demographics 
section which include age, gender, education, year of working experience, and certificates. 
The second part consists of questions that are related to the transparency of financial data. 
The third part tests the level of ownership structure. The fourth part examines the structure 
of board of directors. The fifth part questions the level of corporate social responsibility. 
The sixth part examines the effectiveness of audit committee. The final two parts include 
questions about earnings management incentives and tools.  
 
3.2 Measurement Techniques 
The demographics section which is the first section starts from question 1 till 
question 15, see Appendix A.  The second section, containing all remaining parts of the 
questionnaire begins with question 1 and ends at question 64, uses a Likert scale ranging 
from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Questions 54 through 64 examine earnings 
management incentives and tools.  The corporate governance parts of the questionnaire are 
taken from El-Kassar et al. (2014). The part related to earnings management is self-
developed based on several questionnaire found in the literature (Dima, Ionesscu, and 
Tudoreanu, 2013; Khalil, 2010; El Mehdi & Seboui, 2011).  
 
3.3 Sample  
 The targeted population are MBA, EMBA, LLM, and graduates of the Lebanese 
American University working in different Lebanese corporations. The distributed surveys 
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were 110 in which 76 of them were collected, of which 70 of the 76 were found beneficial. 
The participants answered the questions freely and with high confidentiality after being 
thoroughly informed of the aim behind the research. 
 
3.4 Data Collection  
 Correlation based methods were used to examine the level of corporate governance 
practices and its connection with earnings management practices. Data collection was done 
through questionnaires that were distributed among different employees. The data was 
collected according to convenience due to time limitation. In order to examine the 
hypotheses, scores for each corporate governance components were created: transparency 
of financial statements, ownership structure, board of directors, audit committee, and 
corporate social responsibility. Scores for earnings management incentives and tools were 
made as well. These scores are denoted by the following: 
TRSS: Transparency of Financial Data Score. 
OWNS: Ownership Structure Data Score. 
BDRS: Board of Directors’ Data Score. 
ADTS: Audit Committee Data Score. 
CSRS: Corporate Social Responsibility Data Score. 
EMIN: Earnings Management Incentives Data Score. 
EMIT: Earnings Management Tools Data Score. 
The scores of the corporate governance components are used as the independent 
variables. The scores of earnings management were used as the dependent variables.  
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After adjusting the responses of the negatively worded questions, the various scores were 
created by averaging the responses. Hence, higher scores represent effective corporate 
governance practices. On the other hand, higher earnings management scores represent 
increase tendencies of earnings management practices. A copy of the survey distributed is 
attached presented in Appendix A.  
 
3.5 Statistical Methods 
 Using the scores constructed for each corporate governance component and the two 
components of earning management. The statistical analysis to be conducted to study the 
effect of corporate governance on earnings management practices. Correlations, 
frequencies, Cronbach’s Alpha, and ANOVA are used to examine this effect.  
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Chapter IV 
FINDINGS ANALYSIS and DISCUSSION 
Several statistical methods were used to test the hypotheses developed in chapter 2. 
These included: descriptive statistics, correlative matrix, One-Way ANOVA and regression 
analysis.  
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
In this section, the demographic variables were analyzed using descriptive statistical 
techniques.  
 
4.1.1 Size of Company 
First, the company size measured according to number of employees was considered. The 
SPSS output resulted in the following distribution.  
 
Table 1: Average Size of Companies with respect to Number of Employees 
Size 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1-9 10 14.3 14.3 14.3 
10-19 6 8.6 8.6 22.9 
20-50 13 18.6 18.6 41.4 
> 50 41 58.6 58.6 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
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Figure 1: Average Size of Companies with respect to Number of Employees 
 
 
Note that company size was measured according to the number of employees 
working in it. Out of the 70 companies that were questioned, ten were of a small size firms 
in which they have between 1 and 9 employees; they have a frequency distribution of 
14.3% of the sample. The middle sized companies that have from 10 to 19 employees were 
6 firms representing 8.6% of the sample. In addition, some middle companies that have 
between 20 and 50 working employees were 13 firms representing 18.6% of the sample. 
Finally, large firms that have more than 50 employees were 40 in number and representing 
58.6% of the sample. 
  
36 
 
4.1.2 Years of experience 
 Second, descriptive analysis of the companies’ years of experience revealed the 
following: 
 
Table 2: Average of Years of Experience for the Companies 
Years of 
Experience Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid <5 years 16 22.9 22.9 22.9 
5-10 years 21 30.0 30.0 52.9 
>10 years 33 47.1 47.1 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Average of Years of Experience for the Companies 
 
Experience of the company was measured according to the number of years it has 
been operating. Sixteen companies that have less than 5 years of experience represent 
22.9% of the sample. Those that have an experience from 5 to 10 years were 21 
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respondents representing 30% of the sample. Finally, those that have a large experience, 
which they have been operating for more than 10 years, were 33 firms representing 47.1% 
of the sample.  
 
4.1.3 Board of Directors Size 
 The descriptive statistics for the companies’ board size is shown in the following 
SPSS output distribution. 
 
Table 3: Average Board Size 
BOD  
Size Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1-4 13 18.6 18.8 18.8 
5-10 32 45.7 46.4 65.2 
>10 24 34.3 34.8 100.0 
Total 69 98.6 100.0  
Missing System 1 1.4   
Total 70 100.0   
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Figure 3: Average Board Size 
 
Firms that have board members from 1 to 4 were 13 and represent an average of 
18.6% of the sample. While firms that have a board that consists from 5 to 10 members 
were 32 and represent 45.7% of the sample. Finally, large companies that have more than 
10 members in the board were a total of 24 and represent 34.3% of the sample. 
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4.1.4 Board of Directors Meetings  
 The descriptive statistics of the companies’ board of directors meetings is 
elaborated in the following SPSS output. 
 
Table 4: Average Meetings of the Board of Directors 
BOD  
Meetings Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1-3 14 20.0 20.9 20.9 
4-6 24 34.3 35.8 56.7 
>6 29 41.4 43.3 100.0 
Total 67 95.7 100.0  
Missing System 3 4.3   
Total 70 100.0   
 
 
Figure 4: Average Meetings of the Board of Directors 
 
The board of 14 companies, which meet between 1 to 3 times annually, represent 
20% of the sample. However, the board that meets between 4 to 6 times annually were 24 
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firms and represent 34.3%. Lastly, 41.4% of the sample was represented by 29 
corporations whose board meets more than 6 times per year. 
 
4.1.5 Sales  
 The companies’ sales was also considered in the descriptive statistics and is 
presented in the below SPSS results. 
 
Table 5: Average Sales  
Sales 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid <10,0000 7 10.0 11.7 11.7 
100,000-499,000 17 24.3 28.3 40.0 
500,000-1,000,000 8 11.4 13.3 53.3 
>1,000,000 28 40.0 46.7 100.0 
 Total 60 85.7 100.0  
Missing System 10 14.3   
Total 70 100.0   
 
 
Figure 5: Average Sales 
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Corporations that have less than $100,000 sales were 7 and represent 10% of the 
sample. While corporations that have sales between $100,000 - 499,000 represented 17 
respondents equivalent to 24.3% of the sample. Firms that have sales between $500,000 -
1,000,000 were 8 companies represented 11.4% of the sample. Companies that have sales 
more than $1,000,000 were 28 companies represented 40% of the sample. 
 
4.1.6 Annual Sales over the Last 5 Years 
 The statistical description of the annual sales of the corporations over the last 5 
years is shown in the SPSS output below. 
 
Table 6: Average Annual Sales over the Last 5 Years 
Difference in Sales 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid decreased significantly 3 4.3 5.0 5.0 
decreased slightly 4 5.7 6.7 11.7 
no change 13 18.6 21.7 33.3 
increased slightly 20 28.6 33.3 66.7 
increased significantly 20 28.6 33.3 100.0 
Total 60 85.7 100.0  
Missing System 10 14.3   
Total 70 100.0   
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Figure 6: Average Annual Sales over the Last 5 Years 
 
 
Corporations that experienced a significant decrease in sales in the last five years 
were 3 and represented 4.3% of the sample. However, 4 corporations experienced a slight 
decrease in sales over the past 5 years represented 5.7% of the sample. Companies 
representing 18.6% of the sample were 13, which experienced no change in sales over the 
last 5 years. Twenty firms experienced a slight increase in sales over the past 5 years 
represented 28.6% of the sample. Similarly, 20 companies experienced a significant 
increase in sales over the past 5 years represented 28.6% of the sample. 
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4.1.7 Debt 
 The descriptive statistics for the companies’ debt is shown in the following SPSS 
output distribution. 
 
Table 7: Average Debt 
Debt 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1-25% 24 34.3 39.3 39.3 
26-50% 30 42.9 49.2 88.5 
>50% 7 10.0 11.5 100.0 
Total 61 87.1 100.0  
Missing System 9 12.9   
Total 70 100.0   
 
 
 
Figure 7: Average Debt 
 
44 
 
Corporations that have a debt between 1 and 25% of total assets, represents 34.3% 
of the sample, which is equivalent to 24 firms. Companies having a debt between 26 and 
50% represent 42.9% of the sample, and this is equivalent to 30 firms. Those that have a 
debt greater than 50% were 7 respondents and represent 10% of the sample. 
 
4.2 Reliability Analysis 
The first step of the data analysis is to conduct liability analysis on each component 
of corporate governance as well as the earnings management components. The Cronbach’s 
Alpha (α) values were attained.  
The reliability analysis for the all the components of corporate governance resulted 
in the following output: 
Table 8: Cronbach’s Alpha of CG and EM Components 
Factors N Valid Item Cronbach’s Alpha 
TRS 70 100% 9 0.932 
OWN 70 100% 9 0.872 
BRD 70 100% 19 0.954 
ADT 70 100% 9 0.928 
CSR 70 100% 7 0.903 
EMI 70 100% 7 0.713 
EMT 70 100% 4 0.661 
 
` The above table shows the 70 collected surveys were 100% valid. Each factor 
consisted of a different number of items ranging from 4 to 19 questions. 
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All components of corporate governance and earnings management were checked 
for reliability. A summary of the computer output is presented in table 8. Most of the 
results show that all components had a Cronbach’s Alpha values well the minimum 
threshold of 0.7. Moreover, the two components of earnings management resulted of 
acceptable results of 0.713 and 0.661. This indicates a high reliability of the survey 
instruments so we can proceed with further statistical analysis. 
 Since most of the values are more than 0.7, we can deduce that all questions were 
reliable and additional investigations can be done. 
 
4.3 Correlation Analysis 
The correlation analysis was designed to find the strength of the association 
between corporate governance score and earnings management practices.  
Correlation analysis reveals the following results given in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Correlation Matrix 
          
  
TRSS OWNS BRDS CSRS ADTS CG EMIN EMTN 
 
TRSS  1.000                
 
OWNS  .442   1.000              
 
BRDS  .616   .497   1.000            
 
CSRS  .548   .332   .697   1.000          
 
ADTS  .671   .526   .609   .595   1.000        
 
CG  .717   .671   .921   .803   .818   1.000      
 
EMIN  -.372   -.122   -.376   -.410   -.320   -.394   1.000    
 
EMTN  -.263   -.153   -.218   -.309   -.184   -.263   .103   1.000  
          
  
70 sample size 
     
  
± .235  critical value .05 (two tail) 
    
  
± .306  critical value .01 (two-tail) 
     
46 
 
The correlation matrix reveals that there is a strong negative correlation between 
earnings management incentives score and each corporate governance score. The 
correlation coefficients vary from -0.122 to -0.410. Moreover, the results reveal that all 
correlation coefficients are significant, except for the one corresponding to the ownership 
structure. These support hypotheses H1, H3, H4 and H5. Also, the effects on earnings 
management incentives listed in increasing order are: audit committee, transparency of 
financial statements, board of directors, and finally the most effective corporate social 
responsibility (-0.410). From this, a good practice to reduce earning management 
incentives is to enhance corporate governance practices in terms of  
The above table reveals that corporate social responsibility have the highest 
influence on reducing earnings management incentives with a -0.410 score. The board of 
directors with a score of -0.376 also has a high influence on reducing earning management 
incentives. The transparency of financial data occupies the third place in reducing earnings 
management practices with a -0.372 score. The least influencing factor of corporate 
governance on earnings management practices is ownership structure with a score of -
0.122. 
Obviously, companies which are high on CSR practices value the well-being of the 
society. This indicates, that companies are being more ethical, professional, and consistent 
with the laws and legislations. Thus, this leads to the thought that people working for these 
companies will not be practicing unfavorable activities of earnings management because 
they are involved in the welfare of the society. Moreover, engaging CSR is not only being 
ethical, but also improving the firm’s reputation. This contributes to the idea that the 
corporation is a proactive one which in turn will diminish any kind of negative image. 
Furthermore, being socially responsible encourages employees to be ethical and act as a 
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role model for others which will deter them from doing any unfavorable practices of 
earnings management. These results are consistent with a prior study done by El-Kassar et 
al., (2015) indicating that high practices of CSR improves the performance of corporate 
governance as well as it raises the level of ethnicity and ethics among employees. 
Similarly, Prior et al., (2008) indicated that with the absence of CSR, there is a high 
tendency for engaging earnings management practices. 
Moreover, it can be concluded from the above correlation analysis results that a 
higher degree of board of directors’ independence and effectiveness would also lead to 
lowering the earnings management practices, but to a lesser extent than that of CSR. This 
is because the independent board members, who are outsiders, may have easier access to 
all information and data where they can take actions and decisions without any pressure 
from shareholders. The same result was conducted by the study of Peasnell et al., (2005) 
stating that independence plays a key role in limiting earnings management practices. 
Equally as important a higher transparency in terms of financial statements resulted in 
lowering earnings management practices. Transparency means clarity and honesty. 
Clarifying and reporting all financial activities occurring within the firm and with other 
parties, makes it hard to carry out any unfavorable practice of earnings management. This 
result confirms the study of Hunton et al. in 2016 signifying that high levels of 
transparency will easily expose earnings management practices. Finally, the effectiveness 
of the audit committee has an influence on reducing earnings management incentives. 
Slightly it is at a lower rate than the board independence and effectiveness and the degree 
of transparency in the financial statements.  It is well known that the audit committee 
oversees the work of internal auditors and helps external auditors to a huge extent. This 
leads to the belief that audit committee watches over financial and non-financial activities. 
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It also controls all the actions of internal auditors which makes it hard to engage in any 
unfavorable act of earnings management. This is why audit committee heavily influence 
the incentives of earnings management rather than the tools. Also, the study done by 
Baxter and Cotter (2009) confirm that effectiveness of audit committee decreases the 
practices of earnings management. However, the effectiveness of ownership structure 
doesn’t influence earnings management practices because owners aren’t involved in the 
operations of the company. This contradicts the results of a study done by Aygun et al., 
(2014) which revealed that there is a great significance between the ownership structure 
and earnings management practices detection. 
Based on this, companies that are seeking to limit or prevent any earnings 
management practices should aim to have a higher degree of independence and 
effectiveness of the board of directors, have a higher transparency in the presentation of 
financial reporting, and intend to have a more effective audit committee. All these can be 
achieved within the firm. Besides, the importance of corporate governance in terms of CSR 
should be closely applied in order to prevent earnings management practices. Nevertheless, 
this will require promotion of ethical behavior to hire managers and employees who value 
CSR, and heavily engage in CSR activities both internally and externally. Internally, it 
could be done by directing CSR practices to employees and other stakeholders. Externally, 
the company should direct its CSR efforts to society, government, and customers. Unless 
this practice of CSR was conducted at all levels, lowering earnings management practices 
may not be achieved.  
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4.4 ANOVA 
In the following, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests are conducted to determine 
whether significant differences in corporate governance and earning management practices 
across the various categories of the demographic variables Size of the Company, Board 
Size, Years of Experience, Sales, Difference in Sales, and Debt.  
 
4.4.1 Size and Earnings Management Incentives 
The following is the output of the ANOVA test of Earnings Management Incentives 
across the various categories of company size.  
 
Table 10: Comparison of Means between the Size of the Company and EM Incentives 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error Minimum Maximum 
1-9 10 3.524 .7409 .2343 1.7 4.1 
10-19 6 4.027 .2755 .1125 3.8 4.6 
20-50 13 3.790 .5714 .1585 3.0 4.7 
> 50 41 3.581 .5388 .0841 2.4 4.7 
Total 70 3.650 .5687 .0680 1.7 4.7 
 
Table 11: One-way ANOVA for the Size of the Company and EM Incentives 
 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.466 3 .489 1.546 .211 
Within Groups 20.851 66 .316   
Total 22.317 69    
 
Applying a One Way ANOVA, at a level of significance of 0.05, the effect of the 
company’s size on earnings management incentives is tested. It was found that the 10 
companies that have 1 to 9 employees have an average earnings management incentive of 
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3.52. The average earnings management incentive increased to 4.02 as the company size 
increased to 10-19 employees. However, average earnings management incentive 
decreased to 3.79 as the size of the company increased to reach 50 employees after which 
earnings management incentive continued decreasing to reach 3.58 with a number greater 
than 50 employees. In general, the size of the company does not have an effective 
significance on earnings management incentive. In this case, small and large companies do 
not have high earnings management incentive relative to middle sized companies. 
 
4.4.2 Years of Experience and Earnings Management Incentives 
The following is the output of the ANOVA test of Earnings Management Incentives 
across the various categories of the companies’ years of experience.  
 
Table 12: Comparison of Means between Years of Experience and EM Incentives 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
<5 years 16 3.701 .5231 .1308 2.6 4.7 
5-10 years 21 3.442 .6587 .1437 1.7 4.6 
>10 years 33 3.757 .5063 .0881 2.4 4.7 
Total 70 3.650 .5687 .0680 1.7 4.7 
 
Table 13: One-way ANOVA for Years of Experience and EM Incentives 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.332 2 .666 2.126 .127 
Within Groups 20.985 67 .313   
Total 22.317 69    
 
Entities that have been operating for less than 5 years, have an average earnings 
management incentive of 3.70. Those that have been operating for 5 to 10 years have an 
average earnings management incentive of 3.44. The average earnings management 
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incentive increases to 2.75 for companies that have been operating for more than 10 years. 
There is no overall significance (0.127) between years of experience and earnings 
management incentives. 
 
4.4.3 Board of Directors Size and Earnings Management Incentives 
The following is the output of the ANOVA test of Earnings Management Incentives 
across the various categories of companies’ board size.  
 
Table 14: Comparison of Means between the BOD Size and EM Incentives 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error Minimum Maximum 
1-4 13 3.350 .6769 .1877 1.7 4.0 
5-10 32 3.785 .4656 .0823 2.4 4.7 
>10 24 3.618 .5976 .1220 2.6 4.7 
Total 69 3.645 .5715 .0688 1.7 4.7 
 
Table 15: One-way ANOVA for the BOD Size and EM Incentives 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.780 2 .890 2.875 .064 
Within Groups 20.433 66 .310   
Total 22.213 68    
 
Companies that have 1-4 board members have an average earnings management 
incentive of 3.35. This average increased to reach 3.78 as a number of board member 
increased to reach to reach 10. As the board members increase to become greater than 10 
members, the average earnings management incentives decreased to become 3.61. The 
overall number of board members has nothing to do with earnings management incentives 
with a significance less than 0.05.  
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4.4.4 Sales and Earnings Management Incentives 
The following is the output of the ANOVA test of Earnings Management Incentives 
across the various categories of companies’ sales.  
 
Table 16: Comparison of Means between Sales and EM Incentives 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Minim
um 
Maximu
m 
<100000 7 3.389 .8601 .3251 1.7 4.2 
100000-499000 17 3.825 .4323 .1048 3.1 4.6 
500000-1000000 8 3.556 .4104 .1451 3.0 4.0 
>1000000 28 3.584 .5321 .1006 2.4 4.7 
Total 60 3.626 .5431 .0701 1.7 4.7 
 
Table 17: One-way ANOVA for Sales and EM Incentives 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.152 3 .384 1.323 .276 
Within Groups 16.252 56 .290   
Total 17.404 59    
 
Entities that have sales less than $ 1,000,000 have an average earnings management 
incentive of 3.38. However, entities that have sales between $1,000,000 and 499,000 have 
an average earnings management incentive of 3.82. Similarly, companies that have sales 
between $500,000 and 1,000,000 have an average earnings management incentive of 3.55. 
Average earnings management incentive increased to 3.58 for the companies that have 
annual sales greater than $1,000,000. It is conducted that in general there is no significance 
between the annual sales of the company and its earnings management incentive with a 
significance less than 0.05. 
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4.4.5 Difference in Sales and Earnings Management Incentives 
The following is the output of the ANOVA test of Earnings Management Incentives 
across the various categories of companies’ difference in sales over the past 5 years.  
 
Table 18: Comparison of Means between Difference in Sales and EM Incentives 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error Minimum Maximum 
Decreased 7 3.342 .9860 .3727 1.7 4.6 
no change 13 3.697 .5776 .1602 2.4 4.5 
increased slightly 20 3.660 .5136 .1148 2.6 4.7 
increased significantly 20 3.674 .3196 .0715 3.0 4.4 
Total 60 3.635 .5443 .0703 1.7 4.7 
 
Table 19: One-way ANOVA for the Difference in Sales and EM Incentives 
 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .692 3 .231 .769 .516 
Within Groups 16.790 56 .300   
Total 17.482 59    
 
Firms that have experienced a significant decrease and a slight decrease in sales 
have an average earnings management incentive of 3.04. This average increased slightly to 
3.69 for those companies that did not experience any change in sales. Companies that 
experienced a slight increase in its sales have an average earnings management incentive of 
3.66. Finally, companies that experienced a significant increase in sales, have an average 
earnings management incentive of 3.67. This means that there is no general relation 
between change in sales and earnings management incentive with a significance of less 
than 0.05 (0.43). 
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4.4.6 Debt and Earnings Management Incentive 
The following is the output of the ANOVA test of Earnings Management Incentives 
across the various categories of companies’ debt as a percent of total assests. 
 
Table 20: Comparison of Means between Debt and EM Incentives 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error Minimum Maximum 
1-25% 24 3.727 .5573 .1138 2.6 4.7 
26-50% 30 3.648 .4634 .0846 2.6 4.6 
>50% 7 3.544 .8959 .3386 1.7 4.5 
Total 63 3.651 .5677 .0715 1.7 4.7 
 
Table 21: One-way ANOVA for Debt and EM Incentives 
 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .716 3 .239 .731 .537 
Within Groups 19.266 59 .327   
Total 19.982 62    
 
Companies that have debt, as a percentage of total assets, between 1 and 25% have 
an average of earnings management incentive of 3.72. As the percentage of debt decreased 
slightly between 26 to 50%, average earnings management incentive decreased to reach 
3.64. Finally, as Debt rises above 50%, average earnings management incentive slight 
decreases till 3.54. It can be concluded that there is no significant relationship between debt 
and earnings management incentive at the 5% confidence level. 
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4.4.7 Size and Earnings Management Tools  
The following is the output of the ANOVA test of Earnings Management Tools 
across the various categories of company size with respect to number of employees.  
 
Table 22: Comparison of Means between Size of the Company and EM Tools 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error Minimum Maximum 
1-9 10 2.775 .7308 .2311 1.8 4.5 
10-19 6 3.000 1.0368 .4233 1.8 4.5 
20-50 13 2.615 .8577 .2379 1.3 4.3 
> 50 41 2.896 .9168 .1432 1.0 5.0 
Total 70 2.836 .8815 .1054 1.0 5.0 
 
Table 23: One-way ANOVA for Size of the Company and EM Tools 
 
Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .981 3 .327 .410 .746 
Within Groups 52.630 66 .797   
Total 53.611 69    
 
Significance is at 0.05. By using one way ANOVA to test the effect of the 
company’s size on earnings management tools, it was found that the 10 companies that 
have 1 to 9 employees have an average earnings management tools of 2.77. The average 
earnings management tools increased to 3 as the company size increased by 10-19 
employees. However, average earnings management tools decreased to 2.61 as the size of 
the company increased to reach 50 employees after which earnings management tools 
increased to reach 2.89 with a number greater than 50 employees. In general, the size of the 
company does not have a significant effect on earnings management tools (0.746). 
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4.4.8 Years of Experience and Earnings Management Tools 
The following is the output of the ANOVA test of Earnings Management Tools 
across the various categories of companies’ years of experience.  
 
Table 24: Comparison of Means between Years of Experience and EM Tools 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
<5 years 16 2.906 .5764 .1441 1.8 4.3 
5-10 years 21 3.048 1.1501 .2510 1.0 5.0 
>10 years 33 2.667 .7947 .1383 1.3 4.8 
Total 70 2.836 .8815 .1054 1.0 5.0 
 
Table 25: One-way ANOVA for Years of Experience and EM Tools 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.966 2 .983 1.275 .286 
Within Groups 51.645 67 .771   
Total 53.611 69    
 
Entities that have been operating for less than 5 years, have an average earnings 
management tools of 2.9. Those that have been operating for 5 to 10 years have an average 
earnings management tools of 3.04. The average earnings management tools decreased to 
2.66 for companies that have been operating for more than 10 years. Overall, there is no 
significance (0.28) between years of experience and earnings management tools. 
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4.4.9 Board of Directors Size and Earnings Management Tools 
The following is the output of the ANOVA test of Earnings Management Tools 
across the various categories of companies’ board size.  
 
Table 26: Comparison of Means between the BOD Size and EM Tools 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error Minimum Maximum 
1-4 13 3.000 .6922 .1920 2.3 4.5 
5-10 32 2.609 .8979 .1587 1.0 5.0 
>10 24 3.094 .8871 .1811 1.3 4.8 
Total 69 2.851 .8780 .1057 1.0 5.0 
 
 
Table 27: One-way ANOVA for the BOD Size and EM Tools 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 3.571 2 1.786 2.413 .097 
Within Groups 48.844 66 .740   
Total 52.415 68    
 
Companies that have 1 -4 board members have an average earnings management 
tools of 3. This average decreased to reach 2.6 as the number of board members increased 
to reach 10. As the board members increase to become greater than 10 members, the 
average tools increase to become 3.09.  
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4.4.10 Sales and Earnings Management Tools 
The following is the output of the ANOVA test of Earnings Management Tools 
across the various categories of companies’ sales.  
 
Table 28: Comparison of Means between Sales and EM Tools 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
<100,000 7 3.429 .9433 .3565 2.3 4.8 
100,000-499,000 17 2.382 .9105 .2208 1.0 4.5 
500,000-1,000,000 8 2.594 .4807 .1699 2.0 3.5 
>1000000 28 3.009 .7978 .1508 1.8 5.0 
Total 60 2.825 .8701 .1123 1.0 5.0 
 
Table 29: One-way ANOVA for Sales and EM Tools 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 7.256 3 2.419 3.621 .018 
Within Groups 37.406 56 .668   
Total 44.663 59    
 
Entities that have sales less than $1,000,000 have an average earnings management 
tools of 3.42. However, entities that have sales between $1,000,000 and $499,000 have an 
average earnings management tools of 2.38. Similarly, companies that have sales between 
$500,000 and $1,000,000 have an average earnings management tools of 2.59. Average 
earnings management incentive increased to 3.00 for the companies that have annual sales 
greater than $1,000,000. There is a significance between the annual sales of the company 
and its earnings management tools with a significance less than 0.05. It can be concluded 
that earnings management tools increase as long as the company’s revenue is less than 
$100,000 and more than $1,000,000. This is because firms that have less sales considered 
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small ones where they try to avoid taxes through practicing earnings management. Besides, 
firms that attain high revenues are considered large size companies where the owners are 
different from the managers. Thus, agency theory will occur, and managers will look for 
methods and tools to manipulate earnings for their own benefit.  
 
4.4.11 Difference in Sales and Earnings Management Tools 
The following is the output of the ANOVA test of Earnings Management Tools 
across the various categories of companies’ difference in sales over the last 5 years.  
 
Table 30: Comparison of Means between the Difference in Sales and EM Tools 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error Minimum Maximum 
decreased significantly 3 3.250 1.2990 .7500 2.5 4.8 
decreased slightly 4 3.625 1.1815 .5907 2.0 4.5 
no change 13 2.865 1.1530 .3198 1.3 5.0 
increased slightly 20 2.563 .8424 .1884 1.0 4.3 
increased significantly 20 2.763 .5224 .1168 1.8 4.3 
Total 60 2.800 .8899 .1149 1.0 5.0 
 
Table 31: One-way ANOVA for the Difference of Sales and EM Tools 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 4.542 4 1.135 1.480 .221 
Within Groups 42.183 55 .767   
Total 46.725 59    
 
Firms that have experienced a significant decrease in sales have average earnings 
management tools of 3.25. However, those that experienced a slight decrease in sales have 
average earnings management tools of 3.62. This average decreased slightly to 2.86 for 
those companies that did not experience any change in sales .Companies that experienced a 
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slight increase in its sales have an average earnings management tools of 2.56. Finally, 
companies that experienced a significant increase in sales, have an average earnings 
management tools e of 2.76. This means that there is no overall relation between change in 
sales and earnings management tools with a significance of less than 0.05 (0.22). 
 
4.4.12 Debt and Earnings Management Tools 
The following is the output of the ANOVA test of Earnings Management Tools 
across the various categories of companies’ debt as a percentage of total assets. 
 
Table 32: Comparison of Means between Debt and EM Tools 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error Minimum Maximum 
1-25% 24 2.823 .9281 .1894 1.0 4.8 
26-50% 30 2.742 .7086 .1294 1.3 4.8 
>50% 7 2.821 1.1965 .4522 1.3 4.5 
Total 63 2.841 .8972 .1130 1.0 5.0 
 
 
Table 33: One-way ANOVA for Debt and EM Tools 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 6.672 3 2.224 3.034 .036 
Within Groups 43.241 59 .733   
Total 49.913 62    
 
Companies that have debt, as a percentage of total assets, between 1 and 25% have 
an average of earnings management tools of 2.82. As the percentage of debt decreased 
slightly between 26 to 50%, average earnings management tools decrease to reach 2.74. 
Finally, as debt increases above 50%, average earnings management tools slight decreases 
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till 2.82. It can be concluded that there is significant relationship between debt and earnings 
management tools with a significance of less than 0.05(0.036). 
As a summary, the results of the ANOVA test reveal significant differences exist in 
earnings management for really large companies that have more than 50 employees and 
very small firms that have less than 10 employees. In addition, firms having small board 
size from 1 to 4 are more likely to have less earnings management practices. On the other 
hand, medium size companies with a larger board size, from 5-10 members, tend to witness 
more earnings management practices.  
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Chapter V 
CONCLUSION  
This chapter of the study includes: summary, conclusion and recommendations, and 
future research.  
 
5.1 Summary  
 This study was done to find how each component of corporate governance 
influences earnings management practices. Every chapter in the study was designed to 
analyze the topic researched. For this study to be completed, data was collected from 
different employees in order to examine the effect of transparency of financial statements, 
ownership structure, board of directors, audit committee, and corporate social 
responsibility on earnings management practices.  
Chapter I, represented an overview of corporate governance in general, and its 
importance in the organization’s mechanism. It also included a general idea about earnings 
management practices. Then, a purpose of the study was presented by stating the 
augmented concern about corporate governance and earnings management. In addition, 
Chapter II included the literature review which stated prior studies’ findings and deduced 
the hypotheses that were tested. Different results of several examiners were presented 
which discussed the components of corporate governance and their influence on earnings 
management practices. The methodology which was chapter III in this study, stated the 
dependent and independent variables and also explained the measurement techniques, 
sample, data collection, and statistical methods. Chapter IV, stated the results and analysis, 
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used several tests to examine the hypotheses. Correlation matrix analysis was first used to 
show a significance between corporate governance components and earnings management 
practices mainly CSR, board of directors, transparency of financial reports, and audit 
committee. However, ownership structure showed no significance on earnings 
management practices. Then, a descriptive analysis was done on some factors that might 
influence earnings management practices like the size of the firm, size of the board of 
directors, sales, etc… Finally, a comparison of means was done using One-Way ANOVA 
which explored the relation between the above factors and earnings management tools and 
incentives.  
 
5.2 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 Nowadays, the main issue that organizations are aiming for is sustaining a good 
corporate governance. This is mainly done by focusing on the job of each corporate 
governance component. The main purpose of this study is to indicate the effectiveness of 
transparency of financial statements, ownership structure, board of directors, audit 
committee, and corporate social responsibility on earnings management practices. Finding 
the influence of these components help firms to manage corporate governance properly and 
control earnings management practices. According to the results, firms must invest more in 
their social work which will give relief for stakeholders and distract managers from 
engaging earnings management practices. Also, corporations must highly improve the 
transparency of its financial statements as well as the independence and effectiveness of 
board of directors which will help in taking decisions freely for the favor of shareholders 
and limiting any unfavorable practices of earnings management. 
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As mentioned earlier, the CSR should be closely implemented by firms in order to 
limit the practices of earnings management and improve the performance of corporate 
governance. This will be done firstly by promoting the ethical behavior within the firm’s 
stakeholders. Thus, it is recommended to set up a code of ethics and encourage 
stakeholders to abide by it, implement plans that support the ethical and moral culture of 
the firm, reward employees who act ethically and fire those who do not, then, implement 
CSR externally by helping the society to be make a better place for living.  
 
5.3 Future Research 
 Additional studies could be done to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance component and earnings management practices. Each component of the 
corporate governance whether the transparency of financial statements, the ownership 
structure, the board of directors, the audit committee, or the corporate social responsibility 
can be investigated more deeply by preparing questionnaires targeting only one 
component. Moreover, testing every component thoroughly will help in a sincere 
investigation of the relation between each component and earnings management practices 
alone. This is important to improve the effectiveness of corporate governance, and as a 
result, the corporation’s performance.  
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Appendix A 
Questionnaire 
This is a research project and for this project you will be asked to complete a short 
questionnaire. This questionnaire aims to study the effect of corporate governance 
components on earnings management practices. 
The information you provide will be used to identify any educational needs which can be 
implemented. 
Your answers will not be released to anyone and your identity will remain anonymous. 
Your name will not be written on the questionnaire or be kept in any other records. All 
responses you provide for this study will remain confidential.  When the results of the 
study are reported, you will not be identified by name or any other information that 
could be used to infer your identity. Only researchers will have access to view any data 
collected during this research. Your participation is voluntary and you may withdraw from 
this research any time you wish or skip any question you don’t feel like answering.  Your 
refusal to participate will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are 
otherwise entitled to. 
The research intends to abide by all commonly acknowledged ethical codes. You agree to 
participate in this research project by filling the following questionnaire. Thank you for 
your time. 
If you have any questions, you may contact:  
Name (PI) Phone number Email address 
Dr. Walid ElGammal  Walid.elgammal@lau.edu.lb 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study, or you want to 
talk to someone outside the research, please contact the: 
IRB Office, 
Lebanese American University  
3
rd
 Floor, Dorm A, Byblos Campus 
Tel: 00 961 1 786456 ext. (2546) 
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Part I: Please tick or/ circle the appropriate answer 
1) Your organization size:          a) 1 - 9 employees          c) 10 - 19 employees  
      b) 20 - 50 employees           d) > 50 employees 
2) Your organization’s board of directors size: 
a) 1 - 4 members;            b) 5 - 10 members; c) > 10 members 
3) How many times does the board meet per year? 
                    a) 1 - 3 times                    b) 4 - 6 times                    c) > 6 times      
4)  CEO compensation: 
 a) < $ 50,000                      b) $ 50,000 - 99,000 $        c) $ 100,000 - 149,000         
 d) $ 150,000 - 250,000       e) > $ 250,000  
5) How often do family members who are not members of the legal board attend the 
meeting? 
                   a) Always                            b) Sometimes               c) Never  
6) Do family members engage and participate in board decisions? 
a) Yes                                   b) No 
7) Approximately what are the sales revenues per year? 
a) < $ 100,000                   b) $ 100,000 - 499,000          c) 500,000 - 1,000,000 $                         
d) > $ 1,000,000 
8) Over the past five years the average annual sales revenue has: 
a) Decreased significantly           b) Decreased slightly            c) No change                                    
d)Increased slightly                     e)Increased significantly 
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9) Combined long term and short term debt is approximately what % of equity? 
      a) 0 - 25%                             b) 26 - 50%                     c) > 50% 
10)  Qualifications: a) No degree  b) Graduate   
11) Specialization: a) Accounting and auditing  b) Banking science  
   c) Business Administration     d)Another set 
12) Years of experience: a) ˂ 5 years  b) 5-10 years  c) ˃ 10 years 
13) Professional certificate: a) CA      b) CPA      c) CIA       d) Another set      e) Nothing 
14) Age: a) ˂ 30 years  b) 30-40 years  c) ˃ 40 years 
15) Gender: a) Male  b) Female 
 
Part II: For each of the questions, please tick the most appropriate answer where SD 
represents Strongly Disagree, D represents Disagree, N represents Neutral, A represents 
Agree, and SA represents Strongly Agree. There is an ample level of transparency of 
financial data in terms of 
 SD D N A SA 
1) Financial results      
2) Objectives of the company      
3) Accounting evaluations      
4) Related party transactions: elements and nature      
5) Related party transactions: practices and disclosure 
(under control) 
     
6) Board’s duties and financial communications      
7) Extraordinary transactions regulations      
8) Alternative accounting decisions: impact and analysis      
9) The process for decision making and approval of 
transactions with related parties 
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Part III: For each of the questions, please tick the most appropriate answer. There is an 
ample level of Ownership structure and control privileges  
 SD D N A SA 
10) Structure of ownership      
11) Control organization      
12) Control and equity stake      
13) Control privileges      
14) Existence of meeting agenda      
15) Procedures for holding annual meetings      
16) Shareholders diversity       
17) Actions for Anti-Takeovers      
18) Regulations that cover and guide the corporate 
control 
     
 
 
Part IV: For each of the questions, please tick the most appropriate answer. There is an 
ample level of   Structure of Board of Directors and Management in terms of  
 SD D N A SA 
19) Structure and goals of risk management      
20) Board of directors structure: non-executives versus 
executive 
     
21) Information about board members such as 
qualifications and biographical information 
     
22) Responsibilities and positions of outside board 
members 
     
23) Position held by the executives and the number of 
outside board members 
     
24) Checks and balances instruments      
25) Presence of a succession plan      
26) Conflict of interest prevention through committees and 
governance procedures 
     
27) Governance committee composition and main task      
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28) Board of directors: function and role      
29) Length of contracts for directors      
30) Composition of the remuneration of directors and its 
determinants 
     
31) Number of independent board members      
32) Professional activities for training and development      
33) Reimbursement plan for senior managers in special 
cases such as merger and acquisition 
     
34) Presence of procedures covering conflicts of interest 
among board members 
     
35) Existence of advisors during reporting period      
36) Process for evaluating performance      
37) Management and board members’ material interests      
 
 
Part V: For each of the questions, please tick the most appropriate answer. There is an 
ample level of Corporate Social Responsibility in terms of 
 SD D N A SA 
38) Performance based on social responsibility and 
environmental awareness 
     
39) Firm’s sustainability as a function of social 
responsibility guidelines 
     
40) Regulations to protect the rights of all business 
stakeholders 
     
41) Code of Ethics for board members      
42) Ethical code of conduct for all the employees      
43) Awareness of all the employees about corporate 
governance and their role in implementing it 
     
44) Strategy to protect employees against whistle blowers      
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Part VI: For each of the questions, please tick the most appropriate answer regarding the 
existence and effectiveness of the following elements (Auditing committee)  
 SD D N A SA 
45) Procedures governing collaboration with external 
auditors 
     
46) Procedures and responsibilities for appointing internal 
auditors 
     
47) Reliability of external auditors and board’s confidence      
48) Procedures governing collaboration with internal 
auditors 
     
49) Decision making procedure for appointing external 
auditors 
     
50) Internal control systems      
51) Period of auditor contracts      
52) Audit partner rotation process      
53) The remuneration of auditors and involvement in other 
services non-audit work 
     
 
Part VII: For each of the questions, please indicate to which extent management desires 
(incentives) 
 SD D N A SA 
54) To improve bonuses      
55) To avoid debt contracts      
56) To avoid political costs resulting from legislations and 
government interventions 
     
57) To meet the expectations of financial analysts      
58) To increase the market price of the share at its first and 
second issuance 
     
59) To own shares in order to take control over the 
organization 
     
60) To influence the extent and volume of transactions with 
customers and suppliers in the future 
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Part VIII: For each of the questions, please indicate to which level profits are managed 
through (tools) 
 SD D N A SA 
61) Under/overestimation of accrual accounts of 
discretionary earnings management 
     
62) Category conversion through the exceptional items      
63) Category conversion through the discontinued 
operations 
     
64) Under/Overrepresentation of real activities      
 
